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Executive summary 
 
Concerns over West Africa’s increasingly prominent role as transhipment point of South 
American cocaine en route to Europe are mounting. Gathering pace in the mid-2000s, large-
scale drug trafficking has been associated with recent episodes of political instability and 
violence in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mali. It is also perceived as a serious threat to 
democratic institutions, governance and development in other, more stable countries of the 
region, such as Ghana; and as potentially contributing to reversing the hard-won end to the 
armed conflicts that ravaged Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1990s and 2000s.  
 
Yet it is crucial to recognise that cocaine trafficking through West Africa has thus far not 
resulted in levels of violence comparable to those witnessed in several Latin American drug 
source and transit countries. The big policy challenge for West Africa is therefore not to curb 
the flow of cocaine through the region in order to reduce trafficking-related violence, but to 
effectively tackle the negative impacts – both existing and potential – of the illegal trade on 
governance and development in the region’s weak, unstable and impoverished states. 
Conventional drug control strategies, oriented towards law enforcement, are not well suited 
to help with this. Bold new policy responses are called for.  
 
These concerns mirror heightened awareness within the international development 
community about the negative effects of what the World Bank’s World Development Report 
2011 calls ‘external stresses’ on development, poverty reduction, governance and security in 
countries in Africa and other regions affected by state fragility and violence. External stresses 
– military invasion, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border conflict spillovers, illicit 
trafficking, international terrorism and criminal networks, and price shocks – are believed to 
combine with internal ones – low income levels, youth unemployment, corruption, and human 
rights abuses – resulting in elevated levels of ‘stress’ and ‘new’ forms of violence. Mitigating 
the negative effects of external stresses requires, in the World Bank’s analysis, the affected 
countries to build ‘buffering institutions’ at the national level and enhance cooperation with 
their regional neighbours. 
 
This report interrogates the stressor framework and applies it to the case of transnational 
cocaine trafficking through West Africa. The key innovation presented is that internal and 
external stresses should not be conceptualised as separate but actually as relating to and 
reinforcing one another for they are interconnected through transnational actors and 
processes that are part of broader globalising dynamics. In the case of illicit drug trafficking, 
such as the prohibited trade in cocaine, these dynamics should be understood as 
manifestations of ‘illicit globalisation’. While there is a need for a much better empirical 
understanding of how transnational criminal networks operate in West Africa and what 
impact trafficking has on the region’s states and governance, the problem at hand is arguably 
of a different order of magnitude than involvement in other illicit trades, which have been a 
constant for a long time in West Africa. 
 
The interplay between internal and external factors may not only result in exacerbating the 
existing weaknesses but can actually lead to the emergence of (a) a qualitatively different set 
of challenges for West African states due to the transnational nature of drug trafficking 
understood as forming part of broader processes of (illicit) globalisation; and (b) new political 
equilibriums and settlements, which are, however, likely to be unstable, exclusionary and – 
sometimes – violence-prone. Externally designed and funded strategies to curb the flow of 
illicit drugs through West Africa are not taking these realities into account sufficiently. 
Focused on the overarching goal of reducing the availability of cocaine in Europe by shutting 
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down the trafficking routes through the region, they ignore the political economy of drug 
trafficking in countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Ghana or Mali. Not only does this undercut 
the programmes’ chances of ‘success’, it can also contribute to increasing the likelihood of 
political instability and governance failure. 
 
It is critical to recognise that establishing stronger national institutions and strengthening 
regional cooperation should not be equated primarily with enhancing law enforcement, drug 
interdiction and judicial capacities. Broader political, economic and governance reforms are 
called for. The major task at hand is to devise strategies that effectively enable and support 
West Africa’s states to manage the opportunities afforded to them by, and the pressures 
resulting from, processes of illicit globalisation in such a way that the incentives for national 
elites and their patronage-dependent constituencies to engage in trafficking are reduced; and 
the incentives to build more accountable, legitimate and effective public institutions are 
increased. This requires action at the global, regional and national levels. 
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1 Introduction  
 
In the past ten years, concerns have risen over West Africa’s increasingly prominent role as 
a transhipment point of South American cocaine en route to Europe. Large-scale drug 
trafficking has been associated with recent episodes of political instability and violence in 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mali and is also perceived as a serious threat to democratic 
institutions, governance and development in other, more stable countries of the region, such 
as Ghana. Supported by specialised UN agencies, such as the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), other international organisations and Western governments, the 
members of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) have taken steps 
to tackle the problem, notably by committing in 2008 to a comprehensive regional action plan 
to combat transnational drug trafficking and organised crime. The UN Secretary General and 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) have repeatedly warned that the hard-won end to the 
armed conflicts that ravaged Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1990s and 2000s is at risk of being reversed. A UNSC statement of July 2012 read,  
 
despite significant progress in the consolidation of peace in West Africa, recent 
seizures of power, armed insurrection, piracy, terrorist threats and increased illicit 
traffic [mean] that the security situation [is] precarious and reversible and continued 
international assistance [is] critical in support of regional efforts.  
(UN Security Council 2012) 
 
These concerns mirror heightened awareness within the international development 
community about the negative effects of ‘external stresses’ on development, poverty 
reduction, governance and security in countries in Africa and other regions affected by state 
fragility and violence. The World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011a) on conflict, 
security and development has been instrumental in catalysing debate about these issues in 
the development community, including at the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission (EC) and others. 
External stresses – military invasion, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border 
conflict spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks, and price shocks – are 
believed to combine with internal ones – low income levels, youth unemployment, corruption 
and human rights abuses – resulting in elevated levels of ‘stress’ and ‘new’ forms of violence 
which are ‘[supplementing] continued preoccupations with conventional war between and 
within countries’ (World Bank 2011b: 1). Mitigating the negative effects of external stresses 
requires the affected countries, in the World Bank’s analysis, to build ‘buffering institutions’ at 
the national level and enhance cooperation with their regional neighbours. 
 
This report interrogates the stressor framework and applies it to the case of transnational 
cocaine trafficking through West Africa. The key conceptual innovation presented is that 
internal and external stresses should not be conceptualised as separate but actually as 
relating to and reinforcing one another for they are interconnected through transnational 
actors and processes that are part of broader globalising dynamics. In the case of illicit drug 
trafficking, such as the prohibited trade in cocaine, these dynamics should be understood as 
manifestations of ‘illicit globalisation’ (Andreas 2011). Not only cocaine trafficking itself, but 
also international and regional strategies to control it, reflect the region’s insertion into 
globalising dynamics, albeit on the back of both illegal trade and efforts to stop it.  
 
While this report discusses extensively the need for a much better empirical understanding of 
how transnational criminal networks operate in West Africa and what impact trafficking has 
on the region’s states and governance, the problem at hand is arguably of a different order of 
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magnitude than involvement in other illicit trades, which have been a constant for a long time 
in West Africa. Drug trafficking not only carries the risk of exacerbating existing institutional 
and governance weaknesses, cementing poverty and potentially spurring violence, but also 
has the potential to prompt the emergence of new, qualitatively different challenges for West 
Africa’s states that require bold and innovative policy responses.  
 
Focusing on building stronger national institutions and enhancing regional cooperation 
without paying due attention to the political economy of trafficking and the transformative 
effects it – potentially – has on power relationships and governance in West Africa is likely to 
meet with disappointment. In this respect, it is critical to recognise that in the case of drug 
trafficking, establishing stronger institutions should not be equated with primarily enhancing 
law enforcement, drug interdiction and judicial capacities, though this is important as well. 
Broader political, economic and governance reforms are called for. The major task at hand is 
to devise strategies that effectively enable and support West Africa’s states to manage the 
opportunities afforded to them by, and the pressures resulting from, processes of illicit 
globalisation in such a way that the incentives for national elites and their patronage-
dependent constituencies to engage in trafficking are reduced; and the incentives to build 
more accountable, legitimate and effective public institutions are increased. This requires 
action at the global, regional and national levels.    
 
Starting with a brief critical discussion of the binary internal–external/fragility–vulnerability 
model presented in the World Development Report 2011, the paper continues with a 
description of cocaine trafficking through West Africa and its estimated size, analyses the 
relationship between the region’s states and transnational criminality, addresses the question 
of the risk of increased violence in West Africa on account of transnational cocaine 
trafficking, and ends with a set of policy recommendations. It should be noted that the report 
focuses on cocaine and not on other prohibited substances because of the prominence 
cocaine has gained in trafficking dynamics in West Africa in recent years. The report is also 
centred on analysing issues that are related to the trafficking of cocaine, not its use. Finally, 
while there are of course significant differences between individual West African states in 
terms of their institutional strengths and weaknesses, levels of socioeconomic development 
and political histories, the report adopts a regional perspective. This is complemented by 
country-specific analysis and illustrations, including from the South American cocaine source 
countries, with a focus on two West African countries that arguably are at the extreme end of 
the scale of penetration by transnational criminal networks: Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. 
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2 ‘External stresses’: what’s behind a term? 
The World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011a) highlights the centrality of ‘internal 
stresses’ and ‘external stresses’ for generating insecurity and increasing the risk of violence 
in fragile countries. Among the major internal stresses identified by the World Bank are 
economic factors such as low income levels, youth unemployment, and corruption; security-
related factors such as legacies of armed conflict; and justice-related factors such as human 
rights abuses and impunity. Major external stresses are linked to military invasion and 
occupation, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border conflict spillovers, 
international terrorism and criminal networks, price shocks, and perceptions of global inequity 
and injustice in the treatment of ethnic or religious groups.  
Fundamentally concerned with the human development and security of over a quarter of the 
world’s population that live in fragile and conflict-affected states, the World Bank identifies 
‘organised crime and trafficking, civil unrest due to global economic shocks [and] terrorism’ 
as responsible for spawning ‘new’ forms of violence that have ‘supplemented continued 
preoccupations with conventional war between and within countries’ (World Bank 2011b: 1). 
Adopting a ‘stressor’ approach drawn from contemporary resilience thinking,1 the report 
argues that the risk of ‘new’ forms of conflict and violence stems from the  
combination of the exposure to internal and external stresses and the strength of the 
‘immune system’, or the social capability for coping with stress embodied in legitimate 
institutions... Countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy 
and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able 
to respond to internal and external stresses.  
(World Bank 2011b: 7) 
As Michael Watts puts it, ‘the centrepiece of the vulnerability model [employed by the World 
Bank] is the concept of institutional capacity and legitimacy. Societies that rely on elite pacts, 
coercion, and patronage risk cyclical violence’ (Watts 2012: 120). The World Development 
Report 2011 posits that such countries lack sufficiently robust ‘buffering institutions’ with the 
capacity to absorb external shocks and prevent the shockwaves from wreaking political, 
social and economic havoc. In short, in the World Bank’s analysis, state fragility (internal) 
combines with vulnerability (external) to create situations in which the risk and adverse 
impacts of ‘new’ forms of violence on states, societies and citizens increase significantly. 
This narrative about external stresses and state vulnerability is useful in as much as it makes 
explicit that instability and political disorder are not merely related to domestic weaknesses of 
fragile and conflict-affected states, but are also conditioned by outside forces. Using the 
language of ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ and portraying the state as a normally ‘healthy’ entity 
that comes under stress from both internal and external actors and variables allows the 
World Bank to communicate its argument in easily understandable terms to a broad, non-
specialist audience. However, by doing so, it runs the risk of over-simplifying complex issues 
                                               
1 Originally developed by scholars working on systems ecology, in the past few decades resilience ‘as a science of complex 
adaptive systems and an operational strategy of risk management’ has ‘infiltrated vast areas of the social sciences, becoming a 
regular, if under-theorised, term of art in discussions of international finance and economic policy, corporate risk analysis... 
development policy... and national security’ (Walker and Cooper 2011: 143). Applied resilience thinking, such as in the World 
Development Report 2011, is essentially based on the assumption that shocks and threats to political systems and institutions 
cannot be fully predicted and prevented for they are constitutive and inherent features of social life and organisation. ‘The 
catastrophic event (natural, social or economic)... becomes a sign not of the occasional failure to predict, prevent and manage 
crisis but of the systemic limits to public management and state planning’ (ibid.: 154). In this vein, it is held that a ‘strategy of 
resilience replaces the short-term relief effort – with its aim of restoring the status quo ante through post-catastrophe 
reconstruction – with a call to permanent adaptability in and through crisis’ (ibid.: 154).  
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and framing the analysis in a way that reduces its usefulness for policy purposes. It also runs 
the risk of uncritically reiterating dominant contemporary discourses on global and 
transnational problems, such as the one on transnational organised crime and illicit 
trafficking.  
National and multilateral crime-fighting and counter-trafficking agencies tend to operate on 
the basis of the assumption that with the intensification of globalisation after the end of the 
Cold War, states have come under increasing attack from transnational organised criminal 
groups and networks. These processes have been described as the ‘dark side of 
globalisation’ (Heine and Thakur 2011) in which transnational criminal organisations and 
trafficking networks exploit the institutional and other weaknesses of states for illicit economic 
purposes, making a mockery of national sovereignty by operating across international 
borders, playing off one national jurisdiction against another, and using violence to regulate 
global black markets. The World Development Report 2011 adopts this framework, although 
it also acknowledges that ‘international mechanisms that focus on global or transnational 
issues... have tended to neglect impacts on fragile states’ and that ‘policies are often only 
suitable for the larger, more capable states’ (World Bank 2011a: 217). The existing 
prohibition-oriented, UN-sanctioned international drug control regime and the counter-
narcotics policies that flow from it would be a case in point, but the report stops short of 
elaborating on this politically sensitive issue. 
There is no doubt that illicit trafficking and contraband, cross-border insecurity, and 
commodity price and resource shocks – among other transnational and global pressures – 
create very difficult situations in many developing countries, and particularly in fragile states. 
The problems range from drug-trafficking-related violence epidemics and food riots to 
regionalised conflict and political regime change or breakdown. Yet it is crucial to recognise 
that these complex processes (a) tend to involve external, internal and transnational actors 
and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create losers as well as winners, and can 
promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside of the country or 
world region under ‘stress’; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact on states and 
societies in terms of generating violence. 
Thus, the issue is not merely that state fragility (internal) and vulnerability (external) combine 
to create significant and sometimes overwhelming levels of ‘stress’ in affected countries, 
which can heighten the risk of violence. Internal and external stresses actually relate to and 
reinforce one another, for they are interconnected through transnational actors and 
processes – i.e. ‘regular interactions between state and non-state actors across national 
boundaries [that contribute to shaping] political, social [and economic] outcomes at home, 
abroad, and in an emerging global governance sphere’ (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006: 482). 
Furthermore, these transnational dynamics should be understood as being part of broader 
processes of globalisation, both licit and illicit; states are not just overwhelmed by them but 
play an active role in shaping them. With respect to illicit globalisation, Peter Andreas notes 
that ‘states shape and even exploit the illicit global economy. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, illicit globalisation is not new, and its relationship to the state is not only antagonistic 
but symbiotic’ (Andreas 2011: 405).   
The World Development Report 2011 also does not acknowledge that in some 
circumstances, stresses – external and internal – can have stabilising effects, in that they 
work to the benefit of, or indeed are the making of, powerful state and non-state groups in 
the affected countries or world region (Andreas 2011; Reno 2009a; Abraham and van 
Schendel 2005). Here we have to remind ourselves that ‘illegal flows are not external forces 
that, arrow-like, fly past supine borderland societies. On the contrary they are actively 
domesticated and incorporated into borderland projects’ (van Schendel 2005: 55). Beyond 
the impact of illicit flows like drug trafficking on the structuring of social, political and 
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economic relations in borderlands and between areas in the periphery and the central state, 
these flows also have effects on the national body politic and governance structures, and on 
wider state–society relations. ‘The image of states as simply reactive, responding [or not] to 
the growth of clandestine transnational flows, is misleading because it understates the 
degree to which states actually structure, condition, produce and enable clandestine border 
crossings’ (van Schendel 2005: 59) and illicit flows.  
As will be discussed with reference to West Africa in Section 5 below, external stresses, such 
as illicit drug trafficking, are also not always associated with armed conflict and violence.2 
Depending on the type of policy a government chooses to tackle such stresses, they can 
actually lead (at least temporarily) to development gains in producer and transit countries, 
often in peripheral and desperately poor internal agricultural frontier communities and in 
borderlands that span international boundaries (Goodhand 2009). In settings where drug 
trafficking is driving large-scale violence, such as presently in Mexico, this is related both to 
external factors (such as the massive flow of Andean cocaine through Mexico to the US 
consumer market) and internal ones (such as Mexico’s transition from a closed, one-party 
political system that operated an illicit ‘joint extraction regime’ (Snyder 2006) together with 
trafficking groups, to a more democratic and pluralist system deeply entangled in the US-led 
‘global war on drugs’). 
In sum, while intuitively appealing, the binary internal–external/fragility–vulnerability model 
that underpins the World Bank’s analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to 
inform strategies to address the challenges experienced by states and societies arising from 
external pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, price and resource shocks, 
and climate change. There is a risk that the World Development Report 2011 is contributing 
to the over-simplification of complex issues and the uncritical reiteration of dominant 
discourses about pressures on states, thereby limiting the policy options available to tackle 
what are undoubtedly serious problems for fragile and poor countries, including risks related 
to the outbreak or perpetuation of different types of violence. 
 
                                               
2 The World Development Report 2011 adopts a very broad notion of violence, which it defines as the ‘use or threat of physical 
force by groups, including state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing 
sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious, or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang-
based violence and organised crime, and international, non-state, armed movements with ideological aims’ (World Bank 2011b: 
39). The core of the argument is that these different forms of ‘21st-century violence [do] not fit the 20th-century mould. Interstate 
war and civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years... Many countries and 
subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability’ (World Bank 2011b: 2). Echoing the 
‘new wars’ narrative (Kaldor 2012; Münkler 2002), the Bank perceives violence and armed conflict in their ‘new’ guise as more 
diffuse, recursive and globalised than during the Cold War era, and instrumental for achieving economic gains for private 
violence entrepreneurs such as warlords and drug traffickers. It also perceives violence and armed conflict as less driven by 
states and clearly identifiable organised non-state groups with political and social reform agendas, though the World 
Development Report 2011 does not rule out the existence of such agendas. 
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3 Cocaine trafficking through West Africa: 
the – estimated – size of the beast  
 
Since the mid-2000s there has been mounting concern about the trafficking of cocaine from 
South America to West Africa and from there on to large drug consumption markets, 
especially in Europe. While both regional observers and international officials tasked with 
monitoring global flows of narcotics and combating them have made efforts to gather 
information on their nature and size, assess the impact in West Africa, and devise policy 
responses, the knowledge base remains thin. There is clearly a need for a much better and 
more fine-grained empirical understanding of how transnational drug trafficking in West 
Africa works, and for whom, and what its impacts on the state, governance and development 
are. 
  
Spearheaded by UNODC, which started producing regular reports on West Africa a decade 
ago, work on the phenomenon has become something of an analytical and policy growth 
industry in its own right. Although the debate was initially dominated by sectors within the 
international drug policy and security communities, development agencies have now joined it 
(World Bank 2011a). Yet it is important to caution that the existing analyses tend to reflect 
institutional/organisational interests and mandates rather than rigorous independent 
research. For instance, UNODC’s reporting on drug trafficking through West Africa is heavily 
skewed toward representing a situation that calls for building up increased regional law 
enforcement and interdiction capacities to curb illicit flows – a goal that is at the core of its 
mandate. Subsuming transnational drug trafficking under the metaphor of external stresses, 
the World Development Report 2011, in turn, goes some way toward addressing 
development issues but fails to acknowledge that international counter-drug strategies 
themselves are known to have negative effects on countries affected by trafficking, thereby 
adding to the existing institutional and governance weaknesses and socioeconomic 
grievances.3 
 
Initiatives to address drug trafficking have proliferated in recent years, with West Africa 
witnessing the establishment of a regional drug control architecture that appears to be taken 
straight from a textbook on international drug supply reduction strategies. Much of this effort 
has been driven by international actors, such as the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration, UNODC, Interpol, Europol, the EC, the United Kingdom’s Special Organised 
Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies of EU member states. ECOWAS 
adopted a regional action plan to respond to drug trafficking in 2008 (West Africa 
Commission on Drugs 2013). Consequently, ‘an array of institutions… has been set up by 
the UN and international donors, such as Transnational Crime Units (TCUs), West African 
Joint Operations, the West Africa Coast Initiative, the Dakar-based Intergovernmental Action 
Group Against Money Laundering’ (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012: 129).     
 
The general thrust of these initiatives has been to curb the flow of illicit drugs by 
strengthening the law enforcement and drug shipment interdiction and judicial capacities of 
West African countries, and between them and the South American source countries. 
                                               
3 As will be discussed in more detail below, counter-drug strategies are usually heavily focused on the eradication of coca, 
poppy and other crops used for the production of plant-based psychoactive substances, as well as on the destruction of drug 
production facilities, the arrest of traffickers (and also of consumers), the breaking up of trafficking groups, and the interdiction 
and seizure of drug shipments. Interventions geared toward addressing public health, socioeconomic development and 
governance issues tend to receive much less attention and funding in the ‘war on drugs’, especially in source and transit 
countries. If not properly balanced with other ‘soft’ public policies, ‘hard’ counter-drug policies risk leading to violations of human 
rights, the destruction of livelihoods (particularly in rural areas), and the militarisation and securitisation of governance, 
ultimately contributing to damaging state–society relations.     
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However, it has been noted that ‘there is still limited coordination of activities at the 
operational level, with serious overlap between traditional donor support in the areas of 
governance and the rule of law on the one hand, and counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism 
support implemented by specialised agencies on the other’ (West Africa Commission on 
Drugs 2013: 11). The experience of the EC-funded Cocaine Route programme, launched in 
2009, has shown that transregional cooperation between West African and South American 
law enforcement agencies faces significant challenges due to disparate levels of institutional 
capacity and development on the two sides of the Atlantic. Following in the footsteps of the 
Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy and the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy, in 2013 a group of West African notables joined to form the West Africa Commission 
on Drugs (WACD) and explore alternative approaches to dealing with the region’s increasing 
drug trafficking problems.4 
 
The trafficking of illicit drugs – notably cannabis, cocaine and heroin – through West Africa 
has been known to exist for a long time (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012; Ellis 2009; Mazzitelli 
2007; Klein 1994). But in recent years there have been indications that the volume of the 
trade has increased significantly, especially in respect to cocaine; and a larger number of 
West African countries have become engulfed by it. While the available figures about the 
size of the illegal business ought to be handled with care, shifts in the global supply of, and 
demand for, cocaine in the past years show quite unequivocally why West Africa has risen to 
become an important transhipment point on the cocaine route to Europe. What these 
processes and West Africa’s convenient geographic location do not explain, however, is what 
the role of local actors, including both political and military elites and subaltern groups, has 
been in enabling the establishment of transnational drug economies of significant size 
together with their foreign, notably Latin American, partners in crime; and how political 
marketplaces, elite bargains and power relations in a number of West African countries have 
changed as a result. Before going into these issues it is necessary to provide an overview of 
global cocaine supply and demand dynamics and of the estimated magnitude of the cocaine 
trade through West Africa. 
 
The production of cocaine in the Andean region of South America dates back more than 40 
years and saw its heyday during a 20-year period lasting from the 1980s to the 2000s. The 
multi-billion dollar business has continued since then, though possibly on a slightly reduced 
scale due to significant drug crop eradication and drug shipment interdiction campaigns, 
especially in Colombia. In the beginning, most of the coca leaf used to produce cocaine was 
grown in Bolivia and Peru, the two Andean countries with large indigenous populations and 
millennial traditions of cultivating coca and using it for cultural and medicinal purposes. 
Colombia did not have significant areas of coca crops at the time but served as the site 
where Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine paste – an easily shippable precursor product of the 
final drug – was processed and refined into pure cocaine. Located in the north-western tip of 
South America, with access to both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, the country 
was also the key staging point for the export of refined cocaine to international markets, 
particularly in the US (International Crisis Group 2005a; 2005b).  
 
Prompted by several factors, including coca eradication campaigns in Bolivia and Peru and 
the intensification of Colombia’s armed conflict (which meant that the state’s territorial control 
was increasingly challenged by the insurgents, who alongside numerous criminal and 
paramilitary organisations became ever more involved in the cocaine business), in the 1990s 
both coca cultivation and cocaine production became centred in Colombia. At the same time, 
                                               
4 Following the creation of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy in 2008 under the co-chairmanship of 
former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), César Gaviria (Colombia) and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico), the Global 
Commission on Drug Policy was formed in 2010. The latter comprises some two dozen personalities of international standing 
from across the world. Modelled on the other two commissions, in 2013 the WACD was established under the auspices of the 
Kofi Annan Foundation. All three blue-ribbon commissions have released reports urging the reform of international drug policies 
and the adoption of approaches focused on public health and human rights when dealing with problems associated with drug 
production, trade and use.    
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international cocaine flows became more diversified, in part due to stepped-up, US-led 
counter-drug efforts in the Caribbean and the Andean region. Increasing amounts of the drug 
became destined for the growing European market, while demand in the US market first 
stagnated and then saw a slight reduction. The most significant cocaine-trafficking vector 
from South America to Europe has consistently been the maritime route across the Atlantic 
Ocean. But since the mid-2000s the route from Brazil and Venezuela to West Africa and from 
there across the Sahara to the southern shores of Europe has become another vector of 
some importance (International Crisis Group 2008a).  
 
UNODC (2013a) estimates that there was a very significant increase in the volume of 
cocaine transiting West Africa in the period 2004–2007, rising from 3 tons (2004) to 47 tons 
(2007). This trend was then partially reversed, with cocaine volumes steadily decreasing until 
2010, without falling, however, to the starting level of 2004.  
Table 3.1 Tons of pure cocaine transiting West Africa on their way to 
Europe, 2004-2010 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Tons of 
cocaine 
3 17 32 47 23 21 18 
Source: Adapted from UNODC (2013a). 
 
It is alleged that in 2009, 13 per cent of the cocaine seized in Europe had transited West 
Africa, though this figure could have been substantially higher (Stearns Lawson and Dininio 
2013). Since the late 2000s the region has not witnessed the seizure of large bulk shipments 
of cocaine, which had been common only a few years earlier and had caught the attention of 
local and international law enforcement agencies. Yet West African experts hold that:  
 
Although a decline in trafficking has been reported since 2009, recent cocaine 
seizures in Ghana and arrests of security officers in Sierra Leone and Liberia on 
trafficking charges… are indicators of the on-going problem of trafficking in the sub-
region.  
(West Africa Commission on Drugs 2013)  
 
Similar observations have been made regarding other West African countries, including 
Guinea-Bissau and Mali. 
 
The estimates of the quantities of cocaine that are being trafficked through West Africa put 
forward by different organisations vary a great deal. They are usually based on drug 
shipment interdiction data, such as the data compiled by UNODC from a variety of local, 
regional and international sources. Yet a drop in the volume of annually seized cocaine can 
be attributed to various factors and does not necessarily reflect diminishing flows of illicit 
drugs to the region. Fewer seizures could, for instance, be related to less active law 
enforcement in West Africa due to budget constraints, more aggressive tactics by traffickers 
to bribe local customs, military and other officials, or higher levels of official collusion with 
traffickers. There could also be an element of more cunning avoidance of law enforcement, 
with traffickers breaking up large bulk cargoes of cocaine into smaller parcels that are easier 
to conceal while still at sea. A recently published mid-term review of the EC-funded Cocaine 
Route programme reports that:  
 
As for the current scale and significance of the route the view of Europol is that while 
there has been a decrease since 2009 in seizures of cocaine from [West Africa] as 
well as in the region ‘this is more likely to reflect a change in trafficking methods 
and/or routes than an effective shrinking of cocaine flows toward the region’.  
(Klein, Aku Attakpah and Uribe 2013:153) 
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UNODC data on cocaine seizures suggests that there are two separate trafficking hubs or 
gateways on the West African mainland and one off-shore (UNODC 2013a). The southern 
mainland hub comprises Ghana, Togo, Benin and south-western Nigeria, from where 
cocaine is transported through Niger, Algeria and Tunisia to Spain, France and Italy. The 
northern mainland gateway is centred on Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, The Gambia, the 
Casamance region in south-western Senegal and northern Sierra Leone, from where the 
cocaine is trafficked on the trans-Sahara route through Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco 
to southern Europe, most notably Spain. This route is also used for the transhipment of 
cocaine that enters West Africa through the off-shore hub in Cape Verde. Yet knowing that 
there are identifiable cocaine gateways in West Africa through which an estimated quantity of 
cocaine enters West Africa as a region does not equal knowing how much cocaine enters 
and leaves individual countries. There are no systems in place that consistently monitor 
cocaine seizures in each country (West Africa Commission on Drugs 2013). One can only 
speculate whether particular countries have a larger trafficking problem than others, as 
seems to be the case with Guinea-Bissau in the northern, and Ghana in the southern hub.    
 
Due to these data gaps it is impossible to know with any certainty what the annual value of 
the illegal business in West Africa is, what proportion of the proceeds ends up in the hands of 
West African traffickers and their networks, and what the situation is in the individual 
countries. This notwithstanding, it is not implausible that in a number of impoverished states 
of West Africa drug trafficking represents today an important source of income. This could 
also be reflected in the fact that ‘alongside Central Africa, West Africa is... the continent’s 
biggest source of illegal financial outflows’ (Vorrath 2013). UNODC estimated that in 2006 
the wholesale value of the cocaine that passed through the region (40 tons) amounted to 
US$1.8bn in the European market. Assuming a profit margin of 25 per cent, West African 
traffickers would have earned some US$450m in that year. This figure could, however, be 
higher if they were also involved in retailing cocaine in European countries, which is likely 
(UNODC 2007). In 2009, the wholesale value at destination could have been worth anything 
between US$1.8bn and US$2.8bn for the region as a whole (UNODC 2011) and US$1bn for 
Guinea-Bissau alone (Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012).  
 
Considering that UNODC estimates that the total wholesale value of South American cocaine 
in Europe in 2009 amounted to US$34bn, these figures do not appear to be implausible, but 
they conceal the big value differentials between West Africa and Europe. Experts note that ‘a 
more realistic, though equally speculative, denominator would be the regional wholesale 
price, with cocaine for instance trading at an estimated US$14,000–16,000 in Guinea-Bissau, 
suggesting a volume of several hundred million dollars [per year]’ (Klein et al. 2013: 154–5). 
Still, even comparing these lower figures to the gross domestic products (GDPs) and national 
budgets of the region’s countries shows that with one or two exceptions, such as the oil giant 
Nigeria and economic powerhouse Côte d’Ivoire, they are very large indeed. For instance, in 
2006 Guinea-Bissau had a GDP of US$304m and its national budget was just US$125m 
(UNODC 2007). 
 
The bottom line is that the available data on the size of cocaine trafficking through West 
Africa, the value of the regional market, and the proportion of the trafficking profits that stay 
in the region are patchy and inevitably speculative. But even those who are rightly sceptical 
of the accuracy of UNODC and other data used by the international drug control community 
concede that in the past ten years or so West Africa has become increasingly drawn into 
transnational cocaine trafficking dynamics on the South America–Europe route. With good 
reason they warn, however, that designating the region as a trafficking hub could result in the 
roll-out of counter-narcotics strategies geared at supply-side reduction and militarised law 
enforcement initiatives, which have proved to be ineffective and harmful in other regions 
affected by large-scale trafficking, especially in Latin America (Csete and Sánchez 2013; 
Carrier and Klantschnig 2012). 
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4 Weak national states, powerful 
transnational criminality 
 
At first sight the World Bank’s concept of ‘external stresses’ appears to apply readily to the 
phenomenon of large-scale cocaine trafficking through West Africa. The region is among the 
poorest in the world and the majority of its states are commonly referred to as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ 
or at risk of ‘failing’ – a situation which, it is held, is exploited by global drug traffickers who 
find in West Africa a convenient stepping stone on the cocaine route to Europe.5 Yet our 
understanding of how global forces, such as illicit transnational flows, impact on West African 
states and potentially exacerbate existing authority, capacity and legitimacy deficits is still 
limited. A brief review of the evolution of the academic and policy debates about the state in 
West Africa is in order before moving on to address the particular transformative effects drug 
trafficking has been observed to have or – as its large-scale emergence is relatively recent 
and the full impacts have yet to be felt – potentially could have. 
 
Much of the work on West Africa produced in the 1990s and early 2000s was centred on 
internal factors that were perceived to be responsible for undermining the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of political institutions and driving the emergence of brutal and ‘messy’ armed 
conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and the Niger Delta in 
Nigeria.6 Shocked by the viciousness of West Africa’s civil conflicts, analysts and 
policymakers focused on the political, economic and social factors underlying the rise of 
rebel movements and militant groups; the relationship between natural resources and armed 
conflict; and the role of predatory local elites and the ways in which they abused their power 
to loot national treasuries and appropriate rents – often drawn from extractive industries – for 
private gain and for the benefit of their patronage-dependent constituencies. The treatment of 
external factors was largely limited to examining multilateral peacekeeping and peace-
building interventions in West Africa; the regional transborder movement of insurgent 
fighters, refugees and weapons; and the contraband of diamonds, timber and – in a few 
analyses – illicit drugs.7 Diamonds were of particular concern due to their role in fuelling the 
bloodshed in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and because Western countries were seen to be 
responsible for fanning violence in West Africa to obtain the precious stones, which were 
destined for sale in commercial centres in Europe and elsewhere in the North.  
 
The role of West African political elites and their patronage-dependent constituencies in 
broader and more variegated processes of (illicit) globalisation and as participants in 
                                               
5 A majority of the countries that make up ECOWAS have consistently been at the bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index or are classified as low-income countries by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). 
6 Interestingly, this debate unfolded at the same time as the concepts of ‘failed´ or ‘fragile’ states started to gain currency in 
academic and international policy circles, leading to the creation of several indices that attempt to measure the evolution of 
‘state failure’ or ‘state fragility’ from year to year. A number of West African countries have figured consistently among the group 
of ‘most fragile’ states or states ‘at highest risk’ in these indices. The Carleton University-based Country Indicators for Foreign 
Policy (CIFP) project, for instance, included nine West African states in its first list of the world’s 30 most fragile countries 
(Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania, Guinea and Burkina Faso), which it released in 
2006; in 2008, the index put seven states in the region among the world’s most fragile (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea); and in 2011 eight countries were included (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Mali). Other indices designed to measure state fragility, such as the Failed States 
Index produced by the Washington-based Fund for Peace, have painted roughly similar pictures for West Africa. It is noteworthy 
that the recently created G7+, which comprises 18 of the world’s least developed and poorest countries, also includes six states 
that are located in West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo). 
7 Among the many works produced on these topics are Adebajo and Rashid (2004), Ero and Temin (2004), Le Billon (2006) and 
Reno (2000, 1999, 1997).  
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transnational criminal networks was not of primary concern8 – arguably because these 
dynamics were still less pronounced and visible at the time.9 Curiously, there was also not 
much recognition of the impact that the international financial institutions’ (IFIs) structural 
adjustment programmes were having on the weak and embattled states of West Africa, 
particularly with respect to inadvertently helping to create an enabling environment for the 
spread of corruption and organised criminality.10 In 2004, two leading Ghanaian writers, Eboe 
Hutchful and Kwesi Aning (2004), still felt sufficiently confident to refute the notion of the 
‘criminalisation’ of the state in Africa, which had been fielded by a group of scholars around 
French sociologist Jean-Francois Bayart a few years earlier (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999).11 
However, with hindsight the observation that numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa were 
at risk of increasing and potentially unprecedented pressures on their political institutions and 
governance structures on account of transnational criminal dynamics turned out to be quite 
visionary. Although this is now beyond doubt, particularly in West Africa but also in other 
parts of the continent, such as in Kenya and South Africa, deeper and more fine-grained 
analysis is needed of how transnational criminal networks operate in the continent and what 
the impacts on accountability, transparency, tax revenues and, more broadly, democratic 
governance are.   
 
Responding to increasing concerns about transnational drug trafficking and organised 
criminality in West Africa, several distinct strands of academic and policy research have 
emerged in recent years. Put somewhat schematically, one can be said to be of an ‘official’ 
cut and is principally promoted by the international drug control community, specifically the 
UNODC. The focus of this body of work is on understanding the nature and dynamics of 
organised crime in West Africa and how the international community can support states in 
the region to build up stronger law enforcement, drug interdiction and judicial capacities to 
contain it (UNODC 2013a, 2010, 2008, 2007, 2005; Mazzitelli 2007). Another strand of work 
is broadly concerned with the negative impacts of drug trafficking and other illicit 
transnational activities on the governance structures, security and development prospects of 
African countries, with a special focus on West Africa (Aning and Pokoo 2013; Brown 2013; 
Kavanagh et al. 2013; Olukoshi 2013; O’Regan and Thomson 2013; Cockayne and Williams 
2009; Aning 2007). Two further lines of inquiry highlight the potentially negative 
consequences of militarised anti-drug policies for stability and development in the region 
(Csete and Sánchez 2013; Carrier and Klantschnig 2012), and examine how political elites 
have actively linked themselves into illicit transnational commercial networks as part of their 
strategies to maintain power and assert political authority through patronage and clientelism 
(Felbab-Brown 2010; Reno 2009a).12  
                                               
8 As were other criminal activities of significant magnitude and with transnational dimensions. The massive theft of crude oil in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and its export to international markets is a case in point. Research on this issue has begun to 
appear only recently (Katsouris and Sayne 2013).  
9 Here it is noteworthy, however, that under the umbrella of ECOWAS West African governments began addressing 
transnational security threats, including cross-border crime, money-laundering and the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons, in the 1990s. ECOWAS also set up a Drug Control Unit to provide technical support and expertise to member states 
on drug control matters. Yet several observers have noted that for the most part these initiatives remained on paper only and 
the implementation of policies has seriously lagged (Addo 2008; Obi 2008).     
10 Work undertaken by Kate Meagher (2003) in the late 1990s and early 2000s is an exception to this rule. She makes a 
compelling case that processes of structural adjustment and globalisation resulted in a significant expansion of unofficial, 
‘parallel’ transborder trade in West Africa, including the trafficking in diamonds, drugs and arms. In her analysis, ‘the trade in 
criminal commodities is not merely a product of opportunistic shifts in the commodity portfolio of transborder operators… 
Criminal activities are linked to the entry of new participants thrown up by the social and economic upheavals of structural 
adjustment’ (Meagher 2003: 63). She cautions, however, not to overestimate the importance of criminal transborder activities, 
which in the early 2000s did not outweigh the unofficial trade in cheap and used consumer goods in West Africa. As discussed 
in the present report, there are strong indications that this began to change a few years on with the emergence of West Africa 
as a large cocaine trafficking hub on the trans-Atlantic route from South America to Europe. Recently published work by a West 
African scholar suggests that the spread of informality and corruption in the region due to the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes ‘[laid] the countries open to penetration by well-oiled and practiced global drug cartels with cumulative 
experience from other regions of the world on how to capture institutions and systems to serve their specific ends’ (Olukoshi 
2013).  
11 It is noteworthy that a few years later Aning became engaged in the debate about the impact of organised crime on 
governance in Ghana and West Africa. See, for instance, Aning (2007). 
12 Particularly this last strand of research builds on earlier work on warlordism and the political economy of armed conflict in 
West Africa (Reno 2000, 1999, 1997; Bayart et al. 1999).  
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At the heart of these diverse approaches to analysing and understanding the phenomenon of 
increasing drug trafficking and organised criminality in West Africa are accounts of statehood 
and state weakness in the region. A common view is that the rise of drug trafficking and other 
illicit commerce in West Africa are symptoms and not causes of state fragility (McGuire 
2010). Both the region’s geographic location and its political history and structures are cited 
as key factors enabling the emergence and entrenchment of transnational criminal activities. 
Writes Stephen Ellis:  
 
Not only is West Africa conveniently situated for trade between South America and 
Europe, but above all it has a political and social environment that is generally 
suitable for the drug trade: expertise in smuggling, the weakness of law enforcement 
agencies, and the official tolerance of, or even participation in, certain types of crime, 
constitute a form of social and political capital that accumulates over time.  
(Ellis 2009: 173)  
 
Other authors highlight the ‘predatory’ nature of West African states, which in the past 
decade or so has led political and military elites to latch onto emerging drug trafficking 
dynamics with determination in their quest to secure rents from illicit commerce to maintain 
positions of power and influence (Felbab-Brown 2010; Reno 2009a). The behaviour of ruling 
groups is characterised as ‘rapacious’ and political contestation is seen as essentially 
centring on controlling the state for the purpose of capturing rents (Felbab-Brown 2010), and 
not on aiming to build accountable and effective political institutions. Pervasive patronage 
networks and the existence of large informal sectors are perceived to be blurring the ‘line 
between the state and the official political system on the one hand and… the illegal economy 
on the other’ (Felbab-Brown 2010: 5), providing ample opportunities for the spread of 
trafficking and crime. This is also captured by scholars who use the lens of hybrid political 
orders, where ‘diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order co-exist, overlap 
and intertwine, namely the logic of the “formal state”, of traditional “informal societal order, 
and of globalisation and associated social fragmentation” ’ (Boege et al. 2008: 10). In West 
Africa, such hybrid orders are believed to ‘facilitate the corruption or infiltration of state 
institutions by criminal actors… The step from legal to illegal activity is small and not 
necessarily perceived as such by those involved’ (Vorrath 2013: 2–3).  
4.1 Transformative effects of large-scale drug trafficking  
While this report is not the place to examine in any depth the merits and shortcomings of 
these accounts of statehood and state weakness in West Africa, they provide a useful 
backdrop for discussing the distinctive ways in which large-scale illicit economies of a 
transnational kind, such as drug trafficking, have been observed to impact on or might in 
future impact on, and transform, power relationships, political institutions and governance 
structures in the institutionally weak, politically unstable and impoverished countries of the 
region. Bearing in mind the above-discussed need for more rigorous independent research 
on these matters the core argument is that the interplay between internal and external factors 
may not only result in exacerbating the existing weaknesses but could actually lead to the 
emergence of (a) a qualitatively different set of challenges for West African states due to the 
transnational nature of drug trafficking understood as forming part of broader processes of 
(illicit) globalisation; and (b) new political equilibriums and settlements, which are, however, 
likely to be unstable, exclusionary and – sometimes – violence-prone. The hypothesis is that 
participation in transnational drug trafficking and efforts to counter it produce few 
transnationally networked ‘winners’ among West African political and military elites and their 
patronage-dependent constituencies, and many more ‘losers’. Both benefits and risks are 
likely to be distributed in a highly uneven manner and the negative effects of trafficking (and 
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potentially also of counter-drug strategies) are felt above all by common people, whose 
livelihoods, security, and fundamental rights are subjected to increasing pressures.13   
 
4.1.1 A bigger bang 
Drug trafficking is arguably of a different order of magnitude than other forms of illegality that 
form part of the ‘normal’ (ill-)functioning of the region’s states discussed earlier. Regardless 
of the aforementioned difficulties entailed in estimating the volume and value of illicit drugs 
that transit West Africa annually, there are indications that the amounts of money associated 
with this illegal business could be significantly larger than those drawn from other criminal 
activities, which resourced armed conflicts in the region in the past, e.g. the trade in ‘blood 
diamonds’ and ‘conflict timber’.14 In 1998, at the height of the civil conflicts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, the value of conflict diamonds that were smuggled out of West Africa was 
estimated to be US$400m, including, however, significant quantities of diamonds that were 
diverted from Angola (Meagher 2003). The World Bank reports that annually the illicit trade in 
diamonds and timber was worth some US$60m in Liberia and more than US$25m in Sierra 
Leone (World Bank 2013). Yet another expert puts the value of smuggled diamonds in Sierra 
Leone in the period 1991–2000 at US$25–75m per year (Le Billon 2012).15 Whatever the 
most accurate figures may be, the value of the illicit trade in diamonds and timber in the 
1990s appears to have been significantly less than the estimated value of today’s cocaine 
trade through countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Nigeria. Consequently, the risk 
of corruption in the public sector increases and the political economy of corruption changes 
(Brown 2013). Writes Peter Gastrow:  
 
The sophistication, and ability to corrupt with large amounts of money, is often 
confined to those involved in transnational criminal networks. They are the ones who 
have moved up the social ladder and who mix with the elites because of their wealth, 
skills, and international exposure, and they are the ones who have the means to 
corrupt top figures in government and politics because of the vast profits they earn 
from their illicit trade.  
(Gastrow 2011)  
 
Drug-trafficking-related corruption thus touches broad sectors in the state and society. These 
include not only political and military elites but also subaltern groups, which provide important 
logistical and other services to external traffickers and act as local low-end facilitators. While 
it is likely that this results in an increase of what has been labelled ‘opportunistic corruption’ 
(Cockayne and Williams 2009: 11) among government officials and members of the state’s 
security forces and the judiciary, what seems to be more significant is that in the West Africa 
context such corruption acquires profoundly political dimensions capable of reshaping power 
relationships and political institutions.16 One route for this, which has also been documented 
                                               
13 See Sections 4.2 and 4.3 (with reference to Guinea-Bissau and Guinea). 
14 One exception to this could be the massive theft of crude oil in the Niger Delta of Nigeria – locally known as ‘oil bunkering’ – 
and its sale in international markets. Estimates of the magnitude of this criminal activity vary widely. While the Nigerian 
government estimates that in recent years some 400,000 barrels of oil have been stolen each day (Wallis 2012), other experts 
put this figure for the first quarter of 2013 at around 100,000 barrels per day (Katsouris and Sayne 2013). Accordingly, the 
estimates of the income generated by oil bunkering also vary a great deal and it is not known with any certainty in whose 
pockets most of the profits end up. Yet what is not in dispute is that the proceeds are sizable and have fuelled violence in the 
Niger Delta since the early 2000s.   
15 With all these figures it is not clear, however, whether they refer to the value of the smuggled commodities in the destination 
markets, e.g. Antwerp in the case of diamonds, or the local value, which was certainly less. 
16 This argument is informed by Mark Philp’s (2008) analysis of corruption in post-conflict contexts. In settings where political 
order is contested by the former warring parties the conventional definition of corruption as the ‘abuse of public roles or 
resources for private benefit’ fails to capture that ‘activities undertaken in the interests of one’s political party, ethnic group, or 
familial network… can be… source[s] of major corruption’ (Philp 2008: 313). Corruption is therefore not merely a problem for 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building because government officials and other public and private actors misappropriate 
public funds or turn a blind eye to illegal activities in exchange for kickbacks. What is more problematic is when corruption 
becomes integral to the political agendas of contending groups in the post-conflict setting, and when they use it to systematically 
subvert the emerging political order and structure it in such a manner that it represents their own group interests and not the 
interests of society as a whole.        
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in several Latin American countries, is through traffickers contributing to the electoral 
campaigns of ‘clean’ politicians with drug money or using it to finance their own political 
campaigns. Electoral competition is thus skewed in favour of political groups involved in, or 
which are in collusion with, the drug business (Casas-Zamora 2013; Stearns Lawson and 
Dininio 2013).  
 
It is important to note, however, that the outcomes of these processes are not pre-
determined for they are dependent on specific circumstances, both locally and in relation to 
transnational trafficking dynamics. What can result is either heightened political instability or 
the rise of new political settlements between established local elites and emerging groups 
with ties to external traffickers. Yet as I discuss in more depth below, such political 
settlements are based on bargains that are vulnerable to being quickly undone and are 
therefore likely not to last for very long.    
4.1.2 Impact on political marketplaces and elite bargains  
High-value criminal activity such as drug trafficking reshapes ‘relational dynamics between 
and among political and security actors, the citizenry, and the business community within and 
beyond borders’ (Aning and Pokoo 2013: 5); and it does so in particular ways. It has been 
known for some time that leaders of irregular armed groups in West Africa, who during 
wartime engaged in illicit commerce and other activities that are commonly described as 
criminal, have been adept at establishing alternative forms of public authority and build 
political relationships that ‘are seen by those who participate in them as one of the few 
avenues for active participation in the… economy and politics’ (Reno 2009b: 47). A good 
example in this regard are the leaders of militant groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
who set out to fight for ‘resource control’ but then became involved in criminal activities, such 
as abducting oil industry personnel, oil theft and reportedly also drug trafficking. In 2009, they 
negotiated an amnesty with the federal government, which provided them with judicial 
guarantees and substantial economic benefits in return for their demobilisation (Schultze-
Kraft 2013), and which was possibly designed to cover up federal elite participation in large-
scale oil theft. Thus, far from being threatened by the activities of criminal organisations, 
states or sectors within them have powerful incentives to become ‘criminal instigators 
themselves’ (Locke 2012: 5). In this vein, researchers at the Center on International 
Cooperation write, ‘public officials and political and business elites are not always the 
hapless victims of organised crime as often portrayed, but rather consciously engage in illicit 
activity with the aim of achieving specific political or financial goals’ (Kavanagh et al.  
2013: 7). 
 
Once large-scale drug markets have become established, political marketplaces17 (de Waal 
2009) are prone to undergo significant change. Group loyalties that hitherto were negotiated 
within, and structured by, patronage and clientelistic relationships of a ‘traditional’ kind, that 
is, without significant external influences, become vulnerable to breaking up or being 
transformed. In these circumstances it is arguably more difficult for established ruling elites to 
maintain control of political marketplaces. New, well-resourced players are appearing on the 
scene – including outside trafficking groups – who have the capacity and financial muscle to 
challenge existing power relations and both out-buy and, sometimes, out-gun established 
elites and their patronage networks. New relationships of loyalty and patronage emerge that 
are likely to involve a larger number of groups, including subaltern ones. In extreme cases, 
such as in Guinea-Bissau, this can result in the staging of coups by factions of the military 
                                               
17 Political settlements are essentially established between elites and can usefully be defined as ‘formal and informal one-off 
events, such as elite pacts, peace agreements and amnesties, or a new constitution. But [they] can also take the form of more 
dynamic and fluid processes of (overt and covert) negotiation, compromise, bargaining, accommodation and coalition and 
network-building between powerful groups of state and non-state actors, including influential and resourceful contending groups 
like militant, insurgent and criminal organisations’ (Schultze-Kraft 2013: 8). Political settlements are understood to shape and 
underpin formal institutional and state structures and to regulate competition over resources and the means of violence between 
elites.  
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and political elites that compete over drug trafficking rents, as well as in the capture of the 
entire state by drug-trafficking interests (Shaw and Reitano 2013).  
 
But there can be other, less dramatic, though in the longer term not less pernicious, 
variations of these dynamics. Importantly, elite bargains that underpin existing political 
settlements18 and provide a degree of stability can be shaken up when, for instance, one 
powerful faction becomes involved in the drug business and switches alliances. In the West 
African trafficking context these new alliances necessarily involve the leaders of both local 
and external criminal organisations and their brokers. Other powerful groups which are left 
out of these criminal bargains will have strong incentives to follow suit and establish their 
own alliances with traffickers so as not to end up in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their 
competitors. A vicious circle can result in which progressively more groups that hold sway 
over their country’s political and economic affairs are drawn into the trafficking networks and 
become beholden to criminal interests. Such a scenario appears to be particularly likely in 
states with weak judicial systems and where the rule of law is not upheld. Indeed, to different 
degrees many West African states fall within this category.   
4.1.3 Transnational criminal linkages 
While ‘traditional’ types of criminal activity in West Africa have transborder dimensions to 
them – there is a long history in the region of the smuggling of diamonds and other locally 
sourced commodities, including oil – they are nonetheless essentially ‘home-grown’. Cocaine 
trafficking presents a different scenario. The commodity in question is produced in another 
continent and when it arrives in West Africa it is the property of well-resourced and 
experienced external, notably Latin American, traffickers.19 Evidently, these external actors 
are pursuing their own interests and have modus operandi and organisational structures that 
are more likely than not different from those of their West African partners.20 Unfortunately, 
the evidence on the connections and relationships between external trafficking groups and 
their West African counterparts, especially in the state and wider society, is patchy. The need 
for deeper and more systematic research on these important issues is increasingly 
recognised (Klein et al. 2013; West Africa Commission on Drugs 2013). 
 
A common narrative is that prior to the mid-2000s, when cocaine trafficking through West 
Africa picked up dramatically, the illicit trade was largely dominated by loosely structured, 
non-hierarchical and project-based Nigerian networks with quite significant connections to 
other, less prominent criminal groups across the region. Members of the Nigerian diaspora in 
other countries of sub-Saharan Africa (especially in South Africa) as well as in Latin America 
(particularly in Brazil), the US, Europe and a few Asian countries were also linked to these 
illicit networks. ‘By the mid-1990s…’, writes Stephen Ellis, ‘some Nigerian drug traffickers… 
had not only developed the means to invest in bulk shipments of narcotics, but had also 
                                               
18 The concept of the ‘political marketplace’ has been developed from the observation that in many so-called ‘fragile’ countries 
formal rule-based institutions ‘are subordinate to social affinities and patronage networks… People [in such settings] still care 
about political issues and fight over them, but can neither organise their political allegiances through rule-governed 
organisations nor resolve them through state institutions according to the rule of law’ (de Waal 2009: 99). Political life is 
organised in political or patrimonial marketplaces that resemble an ‘auction of loyalties in which provincial elites seek to extract 
from one or other metropolitan centre the best price for their allegiance… The marketplace of loyalties also operates at a lower 
level, whereby provincial elites secure the support, including votes and guns, of their constituents in return for money, jobs and 
licences to trade or pillage’ (de Waal 2009: 103).    
19 This is particularly the case with the bulk shipments, not necessarily with the smaller-scale trafficking, which involves mostly 
West African traffickers who act as couriers and ‘mules’ (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012). 
20 Here, it is noteworthy that the lingua franca of the global cocaine trade is Spanish, not English and French, which are the 
official languages in most of West Africa. It would be interesting to research what effects the non-Hispanic linguistic context in 
West Africa has on the way Latin American traffickers, who are unlikely to speak French or have a good level of proficiency in 
English, relate to their local counterparts, who in turn are unlikely to be fluent in Spanish. It is not far-fetched to assume that in 
this regard working in West Africa must be more of a challenge for Colombian, Venezuelan and other Latin American traffickers 
than working in, say, Central America, Mexico, Spain and even the US. The linguistic divide might even have a bearing on 
transactions and the nature of the bargains that are struck between external and local actors. In this vein, it is worth asking 
whether linguistic issues have played a role in making Guinea-Bissau such an important cocaine trafficking hub in the past 
years. After all Portuguese is spoken in Brazil and it is more similar to Spanish than English and French. See UNODC (2007).       
20 
 
become fully global, having business associates in both producing and consuming countries’ 
(Ellis 2009: 185).  
 
These dynamics changed with the advent of the shipping of very large bulk cargoes of South 
American cocaine to West Africa in the mid-2000s. New local trafficking networks began to 
emerge in several countries (Mazzitelli 2007) and external trafficking groups started to 
establish bridgeheads in several smaller countries in the region, including in Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea, Ghana and Liberia (Ellis 2009). They have since built connections to:  
 
Well-established local trafficking networks, mainly Nigerian and Ghanaian, who are 
either paid in kind by foreign cocaine-trafficking operators for the provision of 
logistical services, or buy directly from foreign traffickers consignments of up to a 
couple of hundred kilogrammes… These local trafficking networks… are the natural 
successors of local drug-trafficking entrepreneurs who started their operations in the 
region in the last 1980s and 1990s, and who progressively graduated from small 
subcontractors to larger regional independent entrepreneurs.  
(Mazzitelli 2007: 1076)   
 
While this analysis provides insights into the functioning of West African trafficking networks 
and how they have evolved over time, and while it gives some idea of the business 
transactions and relationships between local and external trafficking groups, it does not 
elaborate on what the wider linkages of West African traffickers are to local ruling elites and 
their constituencies and what the role of Latin American and other foreign trafficking groups 
is in shaping these connections. There are some well-informed and hair-raising accounts of 
specific cases of collusion and direct involvement of powerful West African political figures in 
drug trafficking and other criminal schemes (Ellis 2009). But they fall short of revealing the 
bigger picture of how the transnational dimensions of large-scale drug trafficking are 
reshaping power relations and political institutions in West African countries.  
4.1.4 Illegality breeds more illegality 
The relationship between illegality and the production of illicit drugs was observed some time 
ago in the Latin American context.  
 
The location of narcotics production is determined more by the ‘comparative 
advantage in producing illegality’ than by the comparative advantage in the 
production of raw materials for narcotics. Illegality, or more precisely, the lack of 
institutions and law enforcement is typically a necessary condition for large drug 
economies to emerge.  
(Rubin and Guáqueta 2007: 10)  
 
It should be added that once illegality in this sense has enabled the establishment of large-
scale illicit drug production, it is very difficult for the affected country to break out of a vicious 
circle in which illegality produces more illegality. A telling example in this respect is 
Colombia. In the 1980s, this Andean country rose to become the world’s top producer and 
exporter of cocaine while at the same time witnessing the intensification of the armed conflict 
between the state and several insurgent organisations, the emergence of powerful 
paramilitary groups with ties to the military and political elites, and skyrocketing levels of 
impunity and human rights violations.    
   
A similar logic appears to apply to drug transit countries, such as in West Africa. In the case 
of drug trafficking the commodity in question is both by national and international law illegal 
and those who participate in trading it engage by definition in a criminal activity. Arguably, 
this means that the operating procedures of drug traffickers and those who collaborate with 
them are of a different kind and quality than in the case of, say, the illicit contraband of licit 
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commodities like diamonds, timber, oil or cigarettes. Stealth is a key requirement for success 
in the trafficking of drugs, especially when traffickers are faced with the possibility of being 
apprehended by both domestic and external law enforcement agencies and extradited to 
serve long prison terms in the US, for instance. But stealth evidently brings with it reduced 
levels of transparency and increased levels of uncertainty, including for government officials 
who are on the outside of the illegal dealings (Stearns Lawson and Dininio 2013).  
 
Recent research from West Africa suggests that the governance problems that result from 
drug trafficking in West Africa ‘almost always begin in an enclave manner within targeted 
public and societal institutions that are critical to the success or failure of any trafficking effort’ 
(Olukoshi 2013). Individuals and groups within the police, customs, and immigration services 
are drawn into the illegal business in discreet ways that initially may not be obvious even to 
insiders (ibid.). 
 
This indicates that in the early stages of the process of penetrating a transit country external 
and local traffickers are moving with caution, trying to cover their tracks to avoid detection by 
the official security apparatus, international drug control agencies and foreign law 
enforcement agencies. They are aware that the illegal nature of their business requires 
taking special precautions, even if the capacity of the country they are targeting to enforce 
the law and prosecute apprehended traffickers is limited. Yet it is also possible that in some 
cases, particularly in countries with authoritarian and non-accountable governments, this 
process starts at the top with the collusion and involvement of senior public officials, 
including ministers, high-ranking military officers and even heads of state. As will be 
discussed below, this seems to have been the case in Guinea-Bissau under President João 
Bernardo Vieira.  
 
If left uncontrolled, illegality can spread like a bush fire from the bottom to the top or cascade 
down from the top and become an established mode of governance. The more people and 
sectors become involved in the drug business, the less capacity already weak states have to 
extricate themselves from what can be called the rule of illegality. An aggravating factor in 
the case of weak and unstable drug transit countries is that they have little or no control over 
the production and global flows of illicit drugs. These are largely determined by supply and 
demand dynamics, as well as strategies to suppress the production of drugs and stop them 
from reaching the large consumer markets in Europe and North America. While in recent 
years this has begun to change, in the past such strategies were usually designed and  
(co-)funded by governments of countries with large consumer markets, with the US at the 
forefront.  
4.1.5 Unintended consequences of international counter-drug strategies 
Beyond the widely documented difficulties and outright failures of ‘orthodox’ counter-drug 
strategies to achieve their stated goals – that is, to reduce the supply of illicit drugs in global 
markets (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012; Keefer and Loayza 2010; Nossal Institute 2010; 
International Crisis Group 2008a; Schultze-Kraft 2008; Nadelmann 2007, 1988; Youngers 
and Rosin 2005) – they have furthermore tended to be poorly suited to deal with governance 
problems and entrenched structures of illegality and criminality in drug source and transit 
countries. Law enforcement and interdiction-focused anti-drug programmes are prone to 
have counter-productive effects by promoting the transmutation, splintering and both 
horizontal and vertical extension of clandestine and criminal groups and networks. In 
countries with stronger states, spiralling violence and veritable arms races between the 
state’s security apparatus and the trafficking groups are not uncommon results of such 
policies. The cases of Colombia and, more recently, Mexico flash warning signs in this 
respect. As I discuss in the next two sections, in countries with weak governance structures, 
such as is in virtually all West African states, conventional drug control policies may not 
necessarily lead to increased levels of violence because the countervailing forces are too 
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feeble. But they certainly risk further destabilising already unstable settings by, for instance, 
investing in the build-up of law enforcement agencies which cannot be held accountable and 
which may well have strong incentives to work hand-in-glove with trafficking groups.        
 
Against this backdrop, it is important to raise the question of whether international responses 
to drug trafficking situations are qualitatively different from other types of external 
engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, such as mediating settlements of civil 
conflicts, managing humanitarian crises and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. While 
international interventions in general tend to be met with varying degrees of local resistance 
for a variety of (good) reasons, externally driven counter-narcotics strategies often face 
particularly strong objections. This has been shown to be the case on numerous occasions in 
the past in Latin America, for instance, where the US-led ‘war on drugs’ has been one of the 
most polarising political and social issues for decades. It is probably correct to say that the 
only Latin American country that has ever embraced large-scale counter-drug aid from the 
US has been Colombia in the 2000s. Other countries have either been very reluctant to 
accept foreign assistance to combat drug trafficking (Mexico) or entirely opposed to it (Brazil, 
Bolivia and Venezuela at different moments in the past decade). Where external support has 
been accepted this has usually been due to significant pressure from the US and because 
governments and ruling elites feared that they could be overwhelmed by trafficking 
organisations and insurgent and other armed groups financed by the illegal drug business.    
 
In contrast to humanitarian and peace-building missions – which at least purport to do some 
good in the country of intervention, even if the outcomes often do not meet local expectations 
– conventional counter-drug strategies are arguably perceived in a more negative light. This 
is because they have the specific and rather limited goal of curbing the flow of illicit drugs 
from the source countries to the large international consumer markets, especially in North 
America and Europe. As in West Africa, this is usually attempted by focusing heavily on the 
interdiction and seizure of drug shipments, the dismantling of trafficking groups and 
networks, and the capture and judicial prosecution of traffickers (as well as consumers). 
Addressing complex governance and socioeconomic problems associated with the 
production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs tends to receive less attention and fewer funds, 
though international donors have made quite extensive efforts to support ‘alternative 
development’ and ‘alternative livelihoods’ in drug source countries. However, on the whole 
the outcomes of these efforts have arguably been disappointing in terms of ‘deterring the 
cultivation of illicit drug crops’ (Nossal Institute 2010: 6). In addition, to date, far too little 
attention has been paid to addressing and mitigating the significant negative effects of 
strategies focused on law enforcement (often militarised) and interdiction in transit countries, 
which carry the risk of further undermining already weak governance structures and 
promoting a spiral of violence. Consequently, ‘hard’ counter-drug measures in unstable 
and/or poor producer and transit countries have little to offer by way of improving people’s 
living conditions. At the same time, they carry the risk of human rights violations, enhancing 
citizen insecurity and contributing to political instability.  
 
Efforts to curb the flow of drugs through West Africa have officially been assigned priority by 
many political leaders in the region, but real commitment to implementing policies and 
investing political and financial capital in them have not followed suit (Aning and Pokoo 
2013). Furthermore, counter-drug strategies lack legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens 
because it is not evident to them why they should not participate in an economic activity that 
helps them protect their livelihoods in the absence of other, licit employment opportunities. 
Reportedly, there tends to be little social stigma associated with participation in the drug 
business (Stearns Lawson and Dininio 2013). As will be discussed in Section 5 below, with 
the possible exception of militant groups in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and Islamist groups in 
northern Mali (allegedly linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) it appears that drug 
trafficking in West Africa does not fuel armed conflict and in contrast to other world regions it 
is also not associated with high homicide levels. Hence, an important question is why political 
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leaders in the region should put their weight behind counter-drug strategies that risk 
upsetting political balances, might not produce much by way of tangible results in the fight 
against organised criminality and the establishment of more effective and legitimate 
governance structures, and – in countries like Guinea-Bissau – might fly in the face of the 
core interests of those in power.   
4.2 Winners and losers 
The preceding analysis suggests that large-scale cocaine trafficking through West Africa 
produces both winners and losers. However, the latter are by far more numerous than the 
former. Under the existing international drug control regime, playing a role in the illegal drug 
economy means big business and the opportunity for a relatively small group of people 
around the world to accumulate sizable financial, political and social capital. For other, more 
numerous sectors it can be a vehicle to make some money to get by, though likely on a 
temporary basis only and by running high risks. For the great majority of citizens in the 
South’s drug source and transit countries, however, organised criminality and the 
international and local responses to it tend to entail significant threats to their livelihoods, 
fundamental rights and security due to the manifold negative knock-on effects of trafficking 
and of the strategies to control it. These often include political instability and heightened 
corruption and, in some cases, more violence.21 With significant context-specific variations 
this is true for West Africa as it is for other world regions heavily affected by the drug trade, 
such as Latin America and the Caribbean, and South and Central Asia.  
 
As discussed earlier, William Reno has to be credited with bringing to the fore the fact that 
elite involvement in, and sanction of, illicit commerce forms part of West African ruling elites’ 
strategies to assert political authority in the context of political regimes built on patronage and 
clientelism (Reno 2009a). Arguably, there are strong incentives for West Africans to 
participate in drug trafficking, not only by providing logistical support to trafficking operations 
but also by seeking to increase their overall stakes in the illegal business and making it a 
sustainable source of income. This is reflected in West Africa’s ‘upgrade’ in recent years from 
being mostly a transit point on the cocaine route to Europe to becoming a key point for the 
re-packaging, re-routing and re-sale of cocaine. Key officials in sectors within the region’s 
states that control assets which are of strategic importance for the smooth running of 
trafficking operations stand to benefit, at least temporarily. These include military and police 
officers, customs officials, central bankers, staff of the ministries of defence and the interior, 
airport and seaport officials, and so on. Businesspeople in the banking, import–export and 
transport sectors too are seeking to grab their slice of the cake, as are unemployed youth, 
members of the clergy and common criminals (West Africa Commission on Drugs 2013).  
 
In effect, the evidence suggests that there is hardly any sector nowadays in the countries 
that constitute West Africa’s northern and southern trafficking hubs that is not involved in one 
way or another in the illegal business, which two analysts have called an ‘invisible tide’ 
(Cockayne and Williams 2009). For a number of both political and military elites and 
subaltern groups in the region the incentives to draw rents or simply make a living from this 
illicit opportunity are too high not to become involved; and there are no sufficiently strong 
countervailing institutional and social forces, nor are there enough alternative, licit sources of 
income available to marginalised and impoverished groups, to change this highly problematic 
situation. In effect, due to the region’s progressively deeper insertion in processes of illicit 
globalisation through the trade in cocaine and other illicit drugs, West Africa could be ad 
portas of entering a new era of lost development in which bouts of political instability and 
localised outbreaks of violence are preceded or followed by the establishment of new 
equilibriums on the basis of short-lived political settlements centred on the narcotics trade 
and other illicit commerce.      
                                               
21 See Section 5 for a discussion of the relationship between drug trafficking and violence in West Africa. 
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In this respect, one analyst observes that:  
 
To the extent that external drug-traffickers make alliances with internal outsiders – 
former or existing rebels not linked to the official system or young challengers who 
seek social mobility in an exclusive system – the traffickers will develop a conflictual 
relationship with the state, and political instability may well follow. To the extent that 
the governing elite captures rents, a symbiosis between external (and internal) drug 
traffickers and the ruling elites may develop. Drug traffickers will enjoy a sponsored 
safe haven; and while democratic processes and institutional development of the 
country will be threatened, political stability and the existing political dispensation may 
well be strengthened. 
(Felbab-Brown 2010)  
 
As discussed earlier, it must not be forgotten that both scenarios play out in an environment 
in which participation in the drug trade is often viewed as a ‘legitimate form of commerce’ 
(Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012) and there is little stigma attached to participating in it 
because ‘the step from legal to illegal activity is small and not necessarily perceived as such 
by those involved’ because ‘the dividing line between informal and criminal business is 
extremely blurred’ (Vorrath 2013). 
 
In the words of West African and international experts:  
 
In the context of poor or non-existent delivery of basic services, organised criminal 
activities are often deemed legitimate sources of funding for services, at times 
providing income and employment or investment in local communities. The 
reinvestment of drug-related proceeds in the community provides… much needed 
support and services in areas where the government has been markedly absent. The 
latter can be of particular incidence at the local level, where government services and 
resources are limited and citizens seek to sustain themselves through whatever 
means possible.  
(Center for International Cooperation 2012: 4) 
 
Local leaders in the Sahel region are reported to participate in the drug trade as a means to 
sustain their communities’ livelihoods. Elected officials in Ghana and Sierra Leone have been 
found to invest proceeds from trafficking in community projects and distribute cash during 
visits to maintain the support of their constituencies. This helps to lubricate existing 
patronage systems and also skew the outcomes of electoral processes in favour of those 
who partake in the illegal business (Stearns Lawson and Dininio 2013). On the other hand, 
low-end traffickers are seeking to challenge existing power relations and patronage 
networks, including those dominated by traditional leaders and tribal elders and increase 
their social standing (Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012). In several countries of the region, 
including Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Niger, ‘drug trafficking revenues… offer a highly 
tempting fast-track to the top for younger, impatient generations of military officers or social 
groups that feel deprived of their fair share of criminal market revenues’ (Cockayne 2011). 
 
Against this backdrop a key issue is what ‘political stability’ and the strengthening of the 
‘existing political dispensation’ on the back of large-scale drug trafficking means for West 
Africa’s longer-term development prospects; who benefits from it and in what way; and who 
is left out. Arguably, the corrosive longer-term effects clearly outweigh short-term gains. As 
one author points out: 
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The short-term stability of having non-democratic ruling elites enter into ‘symbiotic’ 
relationships with drug traffickers will in the long-term choke off democratic evolution 
in West Africa. The stability of this alliance lasts only until the next group of wannabe 
leaders acts to mount a coup or launch an insurgency. 
(Brown 2013) 
 
Or, it should be added, until external trafficking organisations see it as being in their best 
interest to change local partners or migrate to another West African country where the 
business environment is more stable. This appears to have been the case after the 2009 
turmoil in Guinea-Bissau, when scores of Latin American traffickers relocated to 
neighbouring Guinea, which they reportedly perceived to be a more stable setting for their 
criminal activities (Ellis 2009). 
 
A fundamental problem is that the proceeds from drug trafficking are distributed in a highly 
uneven fashion, and so are the risks involved. With few exceptions, those involved in top-end 
trafficking do not have to fear judicial prosecution, especially if they form part of ruling elites.  
 
Very few political actors have been tried and sentenced for their involvement in drug 
trafficking even when there is sufficient evidence pointing to their involvement. When 
important political figures involved in illicit activity are eventually caught, it is often due 
to the policies and pressures implemented and exercised by third countries.  
(Center for International Cooperation 2012)  
 
While in the past West African political leaders have paid much lip service to the importance 
of reining in drug trafficking, and while in more recent times there have been some genuine 
efforts to this effect (Cockayne 2011), it remains questionable how much real commitment 
and room to manoeuvre there is to make headway on this front (Shaw 2012). ‘It is precisely 
with regard to the exercise of will’, writes one West African scholar, ‘that many [regional] 
governments have faltered and failed as the drug cartels have also launched countervailing 
measures of their own, including penetrating elite intelligence-gathering and enforcement 
institutions with inducements of various magnitudes’ (Olukoshi 2013). 
 
While in extreme cases official top-end traffickers can pay the ultimate price of losing their 
lives (discussed in Section 4.3 in relation to events in Guinea-Bissau in 2009), the risks 
entailed in participating in the illegal business are assumed for the most part by low-end 
traffickers, such as logistical operators and drug couriers known as ‘mules’. Externally 
designed and funded strategies to curb the flow of illicit drugs through West Africa are not 
taking these realities into account sufficiently. Focused on the overarching goal of reducing 
the availability of cocaine in Europe by shutting down the trafficking routes through the 
region, they ignore the political economy of drug trafficking in countries such as Guinea-
Bissau, Ghana or Mali. Not only does this undercut the programmes’ chances of ‘success’, it 
can also contribute to increasing the likelihood of political instability and violence.  
 
External anti-narcotics aid can contribute to bolstering the power of the very groups within 
West African states that are high-end facilitators of the trafficking of illicit drugs. Newly 
created anti-narcotics and specialised law enforcement agencies, such as Transnational 
Crime Units (TCUs), can be co-opted by trafficking groups, providing them with additional 
advantages through access to privileged information and high-tech equipment. Further, aid to 
curb the flow of drugs through West Africa runs the risk of becoming yet another source of 
rents for political elites, which they may use to pursue their own (covert) agendas. This can 
lead to heightened political instability and – sometimes – violence, as will be discussed in 
Section 5. Given the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the region, especially 
among youth, heavy-handed drug control strategies also risk inciting popular unrest and 
further undermining the weak legitimacy of governments (Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012). 
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Armed groups with political agendas and ‘historic animosity toward the state’ (Locke 2012) 
have also shown interest in appropriating proceeds from drug trafficking and have formed 
‘alliances of convenience with criminal groups for profit, access to illicit logistical chains, or 
for the sake of joining forces against a common enemy, the state’ (Felbab-Brown and Forest 
2012). This was recently revealed in Mali, where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb reportedly 
allied with, and provided protection to, drug traffickers along the trans-Sahara route. As two 
observers point out:  
 
Actors involved in organised crime currently wield decisive political and military 
influence in northern Mali… The political system in Mali has in part become reliant on 
criminal proceeds, thereby creating an impenetrable barrier to entry for legitimate 
democratic processes. 
(Shaw 2012: 2)  
 
The former Malian leadership tried to use organised crime as a resource for the 
exercise of influence in the north by allowing its local allies to engage in criminal 
activity. It eventually lost control over the conflicts this generated, while the rule of law 
and the legitimacy of state institutions were eroded through complicity with organised 
crime… The Malian leadership deliberately exploited these tensions to exert its 
influence by playing leaders from certain communities against others and relying on 
select tribes to keep the north under control… The alliance between the Malian 
leadership and local notables based on organised crime also applied to AQIM’s [al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s] kidnapping for ransom business. These 
arrangements go a long way to explain why the Malian security apparatus by and 
large stopped short of confronting AQIM and its practice of using northern Mali as a 
safe haven for its hostage cases. 
(Lacher 2012: 11, 13)  
4.3 Guinea-Bissau and Guinea 
By all accounts both Guinea-Bissau and Guinea are heavily affected by transnational 
cocaine trafficking and may be considered to be at the extreme end of the scale of 
penetration by transnational criminal networks. Starting in the mid-2000s, the two countries 
are reported to have witnessed significant inflows of cocaine from South America. According 
to UNODC (2013a), most of the drugs arrive by ship and aircraft in Guinea-Bissau and are 
then trafficked on to Guinea, Mali, The Gambia and Senegal, from where they continue their 
journey to the European destination markets. Although, as discussed earlier, there are only 
rough estimates of the volume of cocaine flowing into West Africa overall and how much is 
trafficked through the region’s individual countries, Guinea appears to be a preferred conduit 
for drugs that enter the region through Guinea-Bissau. According to experts, this could be 
explained by the existence of what has been called a ‘cocaine axis’ between Bissau, the 
capital of Guinea-Bissau, and Conakry, the capital of Guinea, via the town of Kamsar 
(International Crisis Group 2008b). In both countries, senior government officials as well as 
high-ranking military officers have been linked to the transnational drug trade (see below). 
Guinea’s former president, Lansana Conté, a former general who seized power in 1984 and 
died in office in late 2008, was known for his friendship with João Bernardo Vieira, a three-
time president of Guinea-Bissau, who was assassinated by elements of his own military in 
March 2009. Reflecting Guinea’s extensive meddling in the wars that ravaged several West 
African countries in the 1990s and 2000s, including the 1998–99 conflict in Guinea-Bissau, 
Conté had supported Vieira in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to put down a military 
rebellion against his rule by sending Guinean troops to the neighbouring country. 
 
Official participation in cocaine trafficking was preceded by deep involvement in the illicit 
arms trade in the region, particularly by government officials and military officers in Guinea 
but also Guinea-Bissau. Under Conté Guinea played a critical role in supplying armed groups 
27 
 
in, for instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia with weapons. In 2005, the International Crisis 
Group reported that ‘surprising as it may seem, a mid-level functionary in the [Guinean] 
agricultural ministry, who worked in conjunction with European arms dealers, was 
responsible for issuing 80 per cent of the documentation for illicit arms fuelling West Africa’s 
regional war’ (International Crisis Group 2005b: 15). Guinea’s military hierarchy oversaw 
these illegal operations, which ranged from ‘the supply of ammunition as part of cross-border 
trade to large deals in heavy weaponry and light arms’ (ibid.). In Guinea-Bissau, both 
President Vieira and top military commanders were involved in channelling weapons to the 
separatist Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance in Senegal. In both 
countries, ‘profits from arms trafficking became critical for [civilian and military] elites to build 
and maintain alliances and loyalty – a mechanism of “self-financing” separate from the 
diversion of official budgets and abuse of authorities to feed patronage networks’ (O’Regan 
and Thomson 2013: 17). 
 
With the West African conflicts drawing to a close, by the mid-2000s members of Guinea’s 
and Guinea-Bissau’s political and military elites were faced with the prospects of losing 
significant rents from illegal activities, such as gun running, cross-border trade in goods 
looted by rebel groups and government soldiers, and the illicit appropriation of development 
and emergency aid. The cocaine trade presented them with an opportunity to fill this income 
shortfall, providing them effectively with access to even larger illegal rents than before. The 
indications are that both in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea senior members of the government 
and the military hierarchy latched onto cocaine trafficking with dedication and ease, 
reportedly amassing quite unprecedented wealth and influence in the process (O’Regan and 
Thomson 2013; International Crisis Group 2010). For instance, after Conté’s death and a 
military coup in 2008, his eldest son Ousmane was arrested by Guinea’s new military rulers 
on charges of drug trafficking, to which he eventually confessed publicly on television 
(International Crisis Group 2009: 5).  
 
At the same time, political instability and elite infighting not only persisted but arguably 
intensified, particularly in Guinea-Bissau. Two observers note that:  
 
Powershifts have become more frequent and violent given the huge amounts of 
money involved in the drug-trade relative to the economy. This transcends previous 
patterns of corruption and patronage in Guinea-Bissau, which required a certain 
degree of inter-elite or cross-institutional support. Drug-trafficking has provided both 
the means and motive to sidestep the state and it has sparked its own fierce 
competition.  
(O’Regan and Thomson 2013: 21)  
 
In April 2012, the country’s political process was yet again rocked by a military coup and a 
return to civilian-electoral rule is still pending. While in Guinea the election of President Alpha 
Condé in 2010 – widely considered as the first democratic poll in the country since 
independence from France in 1958 – brought a degree of political stability, and some steps 
to counter drug trafficking and official involvement in it have been taken, relations between 
the military and the civilian government remain tense, as was evidenced in an attempted 
military coup in 2011.   
 
One often-cited example of heightened competition between political and military elites over 
rents from cocaine trafficking are the assassinations of, first, Guinea-Bissau’s Chief of 
Defence Staff, General Batista Tagme Na Wai, on 1 March 2009 and then President Vieira 
on 2 March.22 While the motives for the two killings remain unknown, they have been ‘linked 
to deep mistrust between the political-military elites’, on the one hand, and clashing drug 
                                               
22 Tagme Na Wai was killed in a bomb blast in which a sophisticated remote detonating device was used and Vieira was killed 
hours later by soldiers loyal to Tagme Na Wai.   
28 
 
trafficking interests of both men on the other (International Crisis Group 2009: 1, 3). It may 
well be that both motives were intertwined as it is not unlikely that issues related to the 
control of profits from drug trafficking prompted increasing rivalry between political and 
military elites at the helm of the state. Members of the military are arguably in a privileged 
position to access drug rents.  
 
It is, above all, the complicity of some soldiers which facilitates the traffickers’ work. 
The latter receive local logistical support from soldiers or marines, depending on the 
transit point… The army hierarchy is therefore able to acquire part of vast amounts of 
money injected into the country through drug trafficking.  
(International Crisis Group 2008b: 22)  
 
In April 2013, the US government indicted two senior Bissau-Guinean military officers, 
including the Army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, on alleged drug trafficking charges 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). Furthermore, divisions within the armed forces of 
Guinea-Bissau have also deepened (International Crisis Group 2009). In late 2013, it was 
reported that ‘military alliances are fluid and fast-changing as various factions seek to settle 
scores and vie for political influence and control over the lucrative drugs trade’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2014).  
 
As in other West African countries, international and regional counter-drug efforts in Guinea-
Bissau have focused on curbing the flow of cocaine by strengthening local law enforcement 
capacity, intelligence sharing and the judiciary, and reforming the security sector (West Africa 
Commission on Drugs 2013). For instance, under the West Africa Coast Initiative, which was 
launched in 2010 by the United Nations Office for West Africa to support the ECOWAS Plan 
of Action, Guinea-Bissau committed (alongside Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) to 
establishing a TCU within its judicial police. Arguably, there has been less attention to critical 
governance issues and establishing a consistent political dialogue with Bissau-Guinean 
leaders that could help address deep-seated problems in relation to the penetration of drug 
trafficking interests in the government and military. Chronic political instability has 
undermined counter-drug and anti-crime strategies, as became manifest after the April 2012 
coup, when the US government and the European Union suspended their assistance to 
Guinea-Bissau.  
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5 Cocaine trafficking and ‘new’ forms of 
violence and insecurity 
 
The end of the internal wars of the 1990s and 2000s brought a decrease in the levels of 
violence in West Africa. While data on homicides and other violent deaths in the region are 
hard to come by, the available evidence seems to suggest that (with the exception of Côte 
d’Ivoire) the levels are quite low in comparison to countries in other world regions heavily 
affected by drug trafficking, especially Colombia and Venezuela in the Andean region of 
South America, and El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in Central America.23 Statistical 
data from the World Health Organization compiled by UNODC (UNODC 2013b) indicate that 
in 2008 (the only year for which data on West Africa are available) the average intentional 
homicide24 rate for 15 West African countries25 was 16.1 per 100,000 inhabitants. The 
country which recorded by far the highest rate was Côte d’Ivoire (56.9), followed by Guinea 
(22.5), Guinea-Bissau (20.2), Ghana (15.7) and Benin (15.1). All other countries had 
homicide rates below 15/100,000. In absolute terms, Nigeria had the highest number of 
homicides in 2008 (18,422), followed by Côte d’Ivoire (10,801), Ghana (3,646), Burkina Faso 
(2,786), Guinea (2,152), Benin (1,262), Mali (1,157) and Senegal (1,027). The other 
countries of the region all recorded absolute homicide numbers below 1,000 in 2008.  
Table 5.1 West African homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants and absolute 
number of homicides, 2008 
 
Country Homicide rate Absolute number of 
homicides 
Benin 15.1 1,262 
Burkina Faso 18.0 2,786 
Côte d’Ivoire 56.9 10,801 
The Gambia 10.8 176 
Ghana 15.7 3,646 
Guinea 22.5 2,152 
Guinea-Bissau 20.2 294 
Liberia 10.1 371 
Mali 8.0 1,157 
Mauritania 14.7 485 
Niger 3.8 552 
Nigeria 12.1 18,422 
Senegal 8.7 1,027 
Sierra Leone 14.9 837 
Togo 10.9 627 
Source: Adapted from UNODC (2013b). 
 
While these data present only a snapshot of one year – 2008 – and issues of under-reporting 
have to be taken into account, it seems not unrealistic to assume that with the exception of 
Côte d’Ivoire (which is not among the main drug transit countries of the region) and to a 
lesser extent Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (which are key cocaine transit conduits), West 
                                               
23 In 2008, the figures for these Latin American countries were (in the above order): 35.9/100,000, 52.0/100,000, 51.9/100,000, 
46.0/100,000, and 61.3/100,000. Mexico had a rate of 12.7/100,000 which in absolute terms amounted to 14,006 homicides,  
putting the country in third place after Colombia and Venezuela.   
24 UNODC defines intentional homicide as the unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person. 
25 Excluding Cape Verde, for which no 2008 data are available. 
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Africa is not affected by a ‘violence epidemic’. Thus, so far, drug trafficking through the 
region does not appear to be causing elevated levels of violence.   
 
This interpretation of the available statistical data is backed up by expert assessments of the 
situation regarding violence in West Africa. Both local and international observers underline 
that the region has not witnessed significant levels of trafficking-related violence but warn 
that this could change in the future (Aning and Pokoo 2013; Cockayne and Williams 2009). A 
common explanation for the absence of high levels of violence is that in the West African 
context of weak states, pervasive corruption, low public sector incomes and high levels of 
poverty, paying off state security and law-enforcement officials is an effective means to exert 
influence and keep trafficking operations going. High-level political sponsorship of the illegal 
drug business, especially in Guinea-Bissau but also other countries in the region, is cited as 
another factor that has helped keep a lid on the emergence of ‘drug wars’ of the kind 
witnessed in parts of Latin America.26 In effect, the absence of higher levels of trafficking-
related violence in West Africa could be indicative of the key role the involvement in the 
illegal business plays in the strategies of local elites and their constituencies to assert and 
maintain political authority.  
 
In this context, it is worth recalling that illegal or ‘black’ markets are not inherently violence-
prone. As Peter Andreas points out, ‘actors in the global illicit economy are defined more by 
stealth than by violence’ (Andreas 2011: 417). In some circumstances illegal business actors 
may use violence to regulate transactions in illicit markets because they cannot take 
recourse to lawful forms of regulation. They are operating in contexts of legal uncertainty and 
the enforcement of contracts, the protection of individual and group interests, and the 
punishment of ‘wrongdoers’ may be most (cost)-effectively achieved through the threat or the 
actual exercise of violence (Andreas 2011). Furthermore, systems of loyalty within trafficking 
groups and networks are based to an important degree on members’ understanding that in 
the case of disloyal or treasonous behaviour they stand a good chance of being called to 
account by violent means, which may include their execution by fellow traffickers (Maihold 
and Hochmüller 2013).        
 
This notwithstanding, there is concern that drug trafficking through West Africa could 
eventually fuel violence on a larger scale, including military conflict and terrorist activity. This 
concern is informed by the region’s history of internal wars, which were partly fuelled by the 
proceeds from the smuggling of ‘conflict diamonds’ and ‘conflict timber’. More recently, 
insurgencies and terrorist groups in the Niger Delta and the Sahara have begun obtaining 
resources through the large-scale theft and sale of crude oil and the trans-Sahara trade in 
cocaine and other illicit drugs, respectively. Some authors also point to the potential risk that 
cocaine trafficking through West Africa could lead to Mexican-style ‘drug wars’ or Central 
American-style ‘gang wars’ and skyrocketing homicide rates (Cockayne and Williams 2009). 
These concerns ought to be taken seriously but should not be overblown. There are 
significant differences between the current drug trafficking situation in the region and West 
Africa’s civil conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s as well as the bloodshed in Mexico and Central 
America that have to be considered when assessing the likelihood of increasing violence.  
 
Although West Africa’s civil conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s had distinct origins and features 
in the individual countries, in one form or another they were combinations of violent 
responses to state repression (expressing grievances, especially among youth), resource 
war and conflicts driven by the political-personal agendas of warlords, other strongmen and 
rebel movements that drew resources from controlling natural resources, such as diamonds, 
other precious stones and minerals, and timber. The warriors’ aims were to subdue their 
                                               
26 Such a scenario has been predicted by some analysts. See, for instance, the interesting report by James Cockayne and Phil 
Williams (2009). However, it seems unlikely that West African countries will witness the emergence of ‘drug wars’ à la Mexico, 
Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia because the institutional parameters, state capacities and incentives for elites to increase 
their political and social capital by participating in drug trafficking differ significantly.       
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enemies and competitors and to acquire wealth which could be used to build and lubricate 
patronage networks and also to address socioeconomic grievances among their 
constituencies. This required seizing control of the state, however weak it was. As discussed 
earlier, there certainly were important transregional dimensions to the conflicts engulfing 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, but the main plot, as it were, was 
confined to, and contained within, the West African region; the main actors were West 
Africans, not foreigners (though South African and other mercenaries and shady traders of all 
sorts, including European gun runners and diamond buyers, eagerly flocked to the region; 
and Libya played a significant role in funding and training rebel movements).  
 
The trafficking of cocaine through West Africa presents a very different scenario. First and 
foremost, the shipment of large bulk cargoes of cocaine to West Africa is on the whole not 
managed by West Africans but by foreign traffickers, most notably Latin Americans, though it 
has been reported that Nigerians are involved in some capacity in organising trafficking 
operations from Brazil (Ellis 2009). Latin American traffickers would not use the impoverished 
countries of the region as stepping stones to the European market nearly as much as they 
have been doing since the mid-2000s, were it not for the difficulties they are experiencing 
due to increased and more effective interdiction and law enforcement on other, more 
attractive and important trans-Atlantic routes. 
 
West African trafficking networks appear to be balancing profit-seeking for themselves and 
for their kin and group with efforts to conceal their activities and reinvest parts of the gains in 
building and maintaining relationships with allies in political office. It is unsurprising that this 
would include ‘energising’ the electoral and political campaigns of friends and relatives, 
keeping patronage networks running smoothly, paying off judges and customs officials, and 
so on. Violence is not a central element of strategies of accumulation of economic and 
political capital of West Africans involved in cocaine trafficking and other illicit commerce. 
The chances that the recent civil conflicts could repeat themselves, but this time fuelled by 
proceeds from large-scale drug trafficking, are therefore slim. This does not rule out, 
however, that some militant and terrorist groups that are active in the region are seeking to 
derive income from the drug business by, for instance, providing security and protection to 
traffickers and communities located on trafficking routes, as has been reported to be the 
case with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern parts of Mali.     
 
The gruesome Latin American violence scenarios do not appear to be imminent in the region 
because the West African states most affected by cocaine trafficking lack the authority and 
capacity to mount and sustain larger-scale anti-narcotics strategies focused on the 
interdiction of drug shipments and the targeting of the trafficking networks and their leaders. 
This is the case despite the regional drug control architecture that was established in past 
years with significant international support, which remains work in progress and faces 
numerous operational and political challenges. In this context it is not very likely that feeble 
or half-hearted official attempts to crack down on drug trafficking will spur turf wars between 
competing trafficking groups or prompt them to engage the state in a spiral of violence. 
International counter-narcotics assistance to West African countries is arguably not of 
sufficient size to be able to make any real difference here; and as the cases of Colombia and 
Mexico show, external assistance would only be able to do so if there were very substantial 
buy-in from local governments prepared to ‘take casualties’ and take the war to the 
traffickers. There are no indications presently that this is the case in West Africa or could 
become a reality in the foreseeable future.  
 
It is more difficult to assess whether gang warfare involving mostly youths could result from 
drug trafficking. All West African countries have large young populations and in a number of 
countries sizable youth gangs and cult groups exist, such as the Bakassi Boys and 
Icelanders in Nigeria or gangs of former rebel fighters in Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, 
it appears that the social and political structures in which West African youth gangs operate 
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are quite different from those of their peers in Central America and Mexico. For instance, 
ethnic relations and the role of the family and traditional rule take on different forms in the 
two regions and there are different implications for youth violence associated with them.   
 
The present analysis suggests that the potential for higher levels of violence associated with 
the drug business in West Africa is therefore dependent on whether:  
 
 the control of the illegal market becomes monopolised by one elite group, which could 
prompt other powerful groups to challenge it through violent means; 
 ‘traditional’ patronage networks (which may be based on ethnicity or other identities) 
break up and are replaced by new networks that are lubricated by drug money, 
empowering subaltern groups to challenge established elites, which may result in 
violence;  
 the spoils of drug trafficking become more difficult to attain for all participant groups 
because the volume of drugs trafficked through West Africa (temporarily) decreases 
due to internationally led interdiction and law enforcement strategies (meaning that 
potentially violent competition over drug rents may increase); 
 outside traffickers switch to paying local counterparts more frequently and more 
generously in kind, which carries the risk of a proliferation of trafficking groups in the 
region and which could result in heightened competition between them over a share 
of the illegal market; 
 Latin American and other external trafficking groups with operations in West Africa 
start employing similar tactics as, for instance, in Mexico to enforce loyalty among 
group members and local partners, settle scores or maintain control over high-value 
trafficking assets, locations and routes.27  
 
                                               
27 Although there are reports on killings allegedly carried out by Latin American criminals in West Africa (Brown 2013), this last 
scenario is perhaps the least likely as foreign traffickers will seek to maintain a low profile in the region, knowing that they would 
be disadvantaged vis-à-vis local traffickers, who know their own turf much better. 
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6  Tackling the negative effects of drug 
trafficking on governance and development 
 
As noted at the beginning of this report, underpinning the World Bank’s analysis of external 
stresses is a vulnerability model centred on the institutional capacity and legitimacy of 
fragile/vulnerable states. In the absence of sufficiently robust, effective and legitimate 
‘buffering institutions’, fragile states or states with a legacy of violent conflict are said to risk 
cyclical, recursive violence. This risk is heightened by the impact of external stresses 
stemming from various sources, such as illicit trafficking, cross-border violence spillovers, 
and commodity price and resource shocks. According to the World Bank’s analysis, the 
region in which a state is located defines not only the type of threats it is likely to face but 
also the potential support available to it to help withstand the destabilising impact of external 
stresses. Hence, ‘[regional] collaboration and shared administrative services could create... 
the net gains in capacity that would allow all participating states to better handle organised 
violence’ (World Bank 2011a: 233). 
While this reasoning might apply in some cases – such as with ‘uncontrolled’ economic 
migration and refugee flows, and even cross-border support to rebels provided that an 
agreement to stop such support is negotiated and adhered to by the governments of the 
states in question – it does not readily apply where the nature of the external stresses is 
determined by sweeping processes of (illicit) globalisation, such as in the case of 
transnational drug trafficking. It is likely that tackling transnational trafficking through creating 
stronger domestic buffering institutions and enhancing regional cooperation will be met with 
disappointment, particularly if strategies equate building stronger institutions and enhancing 
regional cooperation primarily with beefing up law enforcement and judicial capacities. It is 
further questionable whether such a strategy would be politically feasible. The global and 
transnational nature of these activities and processes and of the actors involved transcends 
the regional context, which needs to be factored into the policy responses; it is this same 
situation that provides significant opportunities for key (criminal) state and non-state groups, 
including in borderlands, to enrich themselves and amass ‘illicit elite political resources’ 
(Moore 2011).  
Underlying the notion of buffering institutions is the assumption that major global and 
transnational pressures can be neutralised by building stronger domestic institutions, 
presumably at the central government level; and that there is little or no agency on the part of 
transnationally and globally networked groups in the affected countries in the making and 
promotion of such pressures. However, as this report suggests with respect to West Africa, in 
many institutionally weak, politically unstable and impoverished states in the global South 
this is not the case. On the contrary, powerful political and military elites and their patronage-
dependent constituencies are actively engaging in processes of (illicit) globalisation, seeking 
to appropriate rents to maintain positions of power and influence through patronage and 
clientelism. While in some countries and sectors progress has been made, the experience of 
the past two decades and longer shows that major efforts to help build accountable, effective 
and legitimate political institutions of a ‘modern’, liberal-democratic kind have on the whole 
met with significant difficulties in many parts of the developing world. These difficulties are 
known to be compounded by civil conflict and other forms of organised and networked 
violence, which, according to the World Development Report 2011, affect some 1.5 billion 
people around the world today. Transnational drug trafficking and other ‘external stresses’ 
further limit the chances of building effective and responsive states in regions like West 
Africa, including by facilitating their deeper insertion – however precarious and risky – into 
processes of illicit globalisation.  
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The idea that enhanced regional cooperation could effectively shield states from external 
stresses fails to acknowledge the empirical fact that presently whole world regions are being 
overwhelmed by illicit commodity flows that are essentially global in nature, such as the 
large-scale trafficking of cocaine. While the region in which they are located is certainly of 
great importance for the development, security and stability of individual countries, it would 
be erroneous to assume that in and of itself it could provide effective cover from external 
stresses. 
 
An array of regional cooperation mechanisms to tackle the problem have been established, 
including the Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, 
Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa, adopted in 2008 by ECOWAS member 
states. Western donors have supported these efforts, including through innovative 
interventions like the EC-funded Cocaine Route programme aiming at enhancing regional 
cooperation as well as cooperation between West Africa and cocaine source and transit 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet the indications are that thus far the results 
have been meagre, not least because regional cooperation has been bogged down by 
lagging implementation of the Action Plan due to foot-dragging on the part of ECOWAS 
member state governments and insufficient financial and technical resources (Aning and 
Pokoo 2013). Transregional efforts have been hampered by significant differences in 
institutional capacity and development between West Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Klein et al. 2013), and because EC-funded schemes (particularly the Cocaine 
Route programme) are not linked to interventions geared at addressing organised crime 
issues in Europe and between Europe and West Africa.28  
 
To be clear, calling for more effective policies to address the serious problems associated 
with drug trafficking and organised criminality in West Africa does not exclude efforts to build 
legitimate and responsive political institutions in the ECOWAS member states and 
strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms. Yet the overarching aims of policy should be 
framed in a different way and they should not focus on the regional and national levels only, 
but also on the global level, as well as on coordinating and synchronising policy at the three 
levels.  
6.1  Global level 
West Africa’s insertion into the transnational drug trafficking chain is taking place on the back 
of a process of illicit globalisation that is spurred by the UN-sanctioned international drug 
control regime, which prohibits certain substances, including cocaine, in the interest of public 
health. Responding to increasing cocaine demand in Europe and more effective drug control, 
interdiction and law enforcement on the established trans-Atlantic routes from Latin America 
and the Caribbean to Europe, traffickers have opened up alternative routes through West 
Africa. Effective global-level policy to tackle the problem in West Africa therefore needs to 
focus on:  
 
 increasing investment in public-health-focused and human-rights-based interventions 
to reduce cocaine demand in Europe and in other large consumer markets, such as 
the US, Brazil, South Africa and Russia; 
 achieving a new international consensus on drug policy based on the reform of the 
existing international drug control regime. 
 
                                               
28 This means, in effect, that the programme’s interventions are only focused on the Latin America/Caribbean–West Africa part 
of the cocaine route and do not take into account the West Africa–Europe connection. Considering that Europe is the main 
destination market for the cocaine that is trafficked through West Africa and European or Europe-based criminal organisations 
are involved in the illegal business, this represents a significant problem in the design of the programme. 
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Following the second UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) in 2009, 
the third special session is scheduled to take place in 2016. In recent years there has been 
significant drug policy reform momentum, which has been championed by several Latin 
American governments and blue-ribbon commissions, including the West Africa Commission 
on Drugs. UNGASS 2016 represents a critical opportunity for the international community, 
including the member states of ECOWAS, to make progress on international drug policy 
reform. It is therefore a forum of key importance for addressing West Africa’s serious 
problems in relation to transnational drug trafficking and organised criminality.  
 
Both public-health-focused and human-rights-based demand reduction and international drug 
policy reform are longer-term processes that need to be supported by other interventions at 
the regional and national levels in West Africa so that the negative effects of drug trafficking 
can be mitigated and counter-drug and anti-crime strategies can become more effective and 
legitimate. Strengthening the knowledge base on trafficking and organised criminality in the 
region and their impacts on governance and development should be an essential part of 
these efforts. 
6.2  Regional level 
Policy at the regional level should be refocused from being predominantly concerned with 
law enforcement and drug shipment interdiction. Foreign financial and technical assistance to 
West African states should support the interventions outlined below, which should be 
accompanied by continuous high-level political and policy dialogue with regional 
organisations, such as ECOWAS, and partner governments so as to mitigate risks of 
unintended negative consequences of counter-drug and anti-crime assistance. Suggested 
interventions are: 
 
 strengthening cooperation between the member states of ECOWAS and other sub-
regional entities, such as the Mano River Union, on critical regional governance, 
security, violence prevention, public health, and human rights issues; 
 increasing cooperation and exchange of information on drug trafficking and organised 
criminality between West African regional entities and governments and their Latin 
American and European counterparts so as to increase capacities in the region to 
respond to both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors along the transnational cocaine route; 
 avoiding the militarisation of counter-drug and anti-crime strategies in West Africa by 
building up effective and accountable regional criminal justice and law enforcement 
capacities;   
 addressing the limited coordination and the duplication of efforts to tackle drug 
trafficking and organised criminality between and among West African governments 
and the international donor community.  
6.3  National level 
Progressive and democratic forces in political and civil society should be encouraged and 
supported, including by international donors, to demand committed and transparent action 
from their governments to improve governance and counter the negative effects on political 
institutions and development that are found to be associated with drug trafficking and 
organised criminality. Such action should not be limited to strengthening judicial and law 
enforcement capacities but should also focus on: 
 
 strengthening both formal and social accountability mechanisms so as to increase the 
capacity of state entities, civil society organisations and the media to probe and 
expose official involvement in drug trafficking; 
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 reducing the incentives for the constituencies of corrupt political and military elites to 
engage in drug trafficking by offering sufficiently attractive alternative income 
opportunities as well as protection from persecution; 
 preventing violence through social and employment programmes for young people 
and other marginalised sectors; 
 strengthening effective civilian oversight over the armed forces and mainstreaming 
crime- and trafficking-sensitivity in security sector reforms; 
 protecting electoral processes from criminal interference by, for instance, establishing 
effective transparency mechanisms with respect to electoral campaign financing; 
 strengthening the capacity of relevant state entities and civil society organisations to 
rigorously protect human rights. 
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Annex 1: Map showing ECOWAS member 
states 
 
 
 
Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2005).  
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